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boundaries for neural networks
Marcus D. Bloice · Peter M. Roth ·
Andreas Holzinger
Abstract In this paper we propose a new augmentation technique, called patch
augmentation, that, in our experiments, improves model accuracy and makes net-
works more robust to adversarial attacks. In brief, this data-independent approach
creates new image data based on image/label pairs, where a patch from one of the
two images in the pair is superimposed on to the other image, creating a new
augmented sample. The new image’s label is a linear combination of the image
pair’s corresponding labels. Initial experiments show a several percentage point
increase in accuracy on CIFAR-10, from a baseline of approximately 81% to 89%.
CIFAR-100 sees larger improvements still, from a baseline of 52% to 68% accuracy.
Networks trained using patch augmentation are also more robust to adversarial
attacks, which we demonstrate using the Fast Gradient Sign Method.
Keywords Augmentation · Adversarial attacks · Decision boundaries
1 Introduction
An adversarial misclassification, or adversarial attack, occurs when an image that
should seemingly be easily classified correctly by a neural network is suddenly
classified as belonging to a completely different class—and with high confidence.
Such occurrences are difficult to diagnose and are a cause of much concern in arti-
ficial intelligence research, as any model trained with empirical risk minimisation
seems to be vulnerable to such attacks. The ease at which neural networks are sus-
ceptible to adversarial perturbations are partially the result of images lying close
to the decision boundaries that are typically learned by neural networks during
their training. Patch augmentation is an attempt to train more efficient decision
boundaries.
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A recent article in Nature has reported on the concerns within artificial intel-
ligence research at the ease at which neural networks are “fooled” by adversarial
examples [7]. In other words, it has increasingly been shown that state-of-the-art
neural networks are failing in quite unexpected and often catastrophic ways. An
adversarial example is data, for example an image, that contains an almost im-
perceptible alteration to it, which when fed in to a neural network causes it to
misclassify the image in unpredictable ways, often with a high degree of confi-
dence. This is believed to be at least partially caused by the decision boundaries
that are typically learned by neural networks in combination with empirical risk
minimisation.
The term “adversarial examples” was, for instance, discussed in [14] where they
were defined as images that were able to “trick” well performing neural networks,
seemingly with ease. This led to concerns that neural networks were perhaps brit-
tle or fragile, and that despite counter measures such as regularisation, networks
were in fact memorising data sets too closely. The fragility of neural networks to
adversarial attacks is perhaps most clearly illustrated by work performed in [13]
that showed networks can output a confident, incorrect prediction by altering just
a single pixel in an input image.
The real life seriousness of adversarial examples was demonstrated nicely by
[3], where the authors demonstrated that road signs that are trivial to correctly
identified by the human eye are interpreted incorrectly by a neural network. For
instance, a speed limit or stop sign was recognised as a higher speed limit, causing
serious, life-threatening dangers.
Neural networks and deep learning are increasingly being used in medicine,
particularly in the field of digital pathology where AI is seen as an important and
potentially impactful area where highly skilled pathologists could be supported by
deep learning-based systems. However, a study has shown that cancer misdiagnosis
can occur due to tiny adversarial perturbations, in networks that otherwise perform
extremely well [4].
A different, but yet more serious problem is that adversarial examples can
be transferred across different networks [14]. Even when trained with different
hyper-parameters, such as the number of layers or trained on different subsets,
the networks are still susceptible to the same adversarial attacks. In other words,
one does not need access to the trained network in order to devise an adversarial
attack.
Adversarial examples are not limited to neural networks, however. It has been
shown that several types of algorithm are susceptible to adversarial misclassifica-
tions [12]). It has been shown that multi-class Logistic Regression, Support Vector
Machines, Decision Trees, and k-Nearest Neighbours are all susceptible to exactly
the same types of attacks or examples.
These issues are have been attributed to images that lie close to the learned
decision boundaries in trained neural networks [5]. Attempts are afoot to regularise
training so that more efficient decision boundaries can be learned. In contrast, we
tackle the problem by introducing a data augmentation method which coerces the
network to taking less confident decisions, making them more robust to adver-
sarial perturbations and thus less prone to misclassifications. Therefore, in this
paper we propose an augmentation technique to counter the issues that result in
unfavourable decision boundaries. Primarily, this to alleviate the issue of adversar-
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ial attacks and misclassifications, however the technique is also useful to mitigate
against memorisation and can make networks more general.
To demonstrate the benefits of our approach, we show experimental results
for two different scenarios. First, we show that using the proposed augmentation
technique results in a significant increase in classification accuracy for CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 using ResNet v1 and v2. Second, we demonstrate that, at the same
time, the trained networks are much more robust against adversarial attacks.
2 Related Work
Image augmentation is a technique used to regularise networks and make them
more general. The procedure involves expanding an existing data set by applying
transformations to the training image data in order to create new data, while
ensuring that the data’s labels are preserved. Increasing the size of a data set
in this way can prevent memorisation of the data set, and hence prevent over-
fitting. Image augmentation in computer vision is a widely used technique, and
became popular for neural network training since the work of [10], where random
distortions were applied to the original MNIST images to create new samples.
The distortions that can be applied to images range from simple rotations or flips
along the horizontal and vertical axes, to more elaborate methods, such as elastic
distortions. Indeed, the wide breadth of different types of augmentation has led
to the development of stand-alone augmentation libraries, such as Augmentor1,
written by the first author of this paper [1].
However, image augmentation is generally a data-dependent task that requires
a certain amount of domain knowledge in order to develop a successful augmen-
tation strategy. For example, it must be clear that any transformations that are
applied to the image data are label preserving—for instance, that a horizontal flip
will not result in an image where its label is no longer representative of the image’s
contents. A simple example might be the images in a digit recognition task—the
figure 8 can be translated through both the horizontal and vertical axes while
preserving the image’s label, while the figure 7 cannot be translated through ei-
ther axis without its label no longer representing the image. Hence, augmentation
strategies often require domain knowledge.
Approaches to create data-independent augmentation techniques include Au-
toAugment [2] where the augmentation procedure is learned as the network is
trained, adjusting the augmentation policy’s hyper-parameters on the fly. How-
ever, this procedure adds a further learning procedure, which requires more train-
ing time and iterations. More recently than AutoAugment, a population-based
automatic augmentation technique has been proposed [8] which performs more
efficiently than AutoAugment. Work by [16] specifically demonstrated augmenta-
tion as an approach to the decision boundary problem and adversarial examples.
They demonstrated the mixup algorithm which performs a linear combination of
two images and their labels to create augmented images. This approach proved to
be highly effective, and in this work we wish to propose a similar, more parametric
technique which outperforms mixup in our initial experiments.
1 See https://github.com/mdbloice/Augmentor
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Therefore, in this work, we discuss patch augmentation, which is a data-
independent approach aimed at improving model generalisation and mitigating
against adversarial attacks. In Section 4 we describe our approach in detail and
give experimental results in Section 5.
3 How Patch Augmentation Works
In essence, the idea behind patch augmentation is to create new image data based
on pairs of images and their labels. As Figure 1 shows, a patch of a certain size
is copied from image A and superimposed on to image B at a random location,
creating a new augmented image. The new image’s label, which must be one-hot-
encoded, is a linear combination of the image pair’s labels, based on the size of
the area of the patch in relation to the size of the entire image, in pixels.
Fig. 1: Patch augmentation creates new image data by extracting a patch from
an image, in this case from Class B, and placing it in to another image from a
different class, in this case Class A. The location from where the patch is extracted
is randomly chosen for each newly created, augmented image. Its new label, which
must be one-hot-encoded, is computed from the original image pair’s two labels,
in this case the computed label is y˜ = [0.85, 0.15], as the patch’s area is 15% of
the new image’s size and the original image pair’s labels are [1.0, 0.0] and [0.0, 1.0]
for Class A and Class B respectively.
The patches that are extracted are of a random shape and size, the area of
which are controlled by minimum/maximum width/height parameters. Figure 2
shows a number of examples of images created by patch augmentation for a binary
class data set. Notice that the augmented images can contain patches from the
same class. In order to demonstrate the method in a fully reproducible manner,
source code, Jupyter demonstration notebooks, and the complete experimental
setup described in this paper can be found here under:
https://github.com/mdbloice/Patch-Augmentation
A more complete description of the patch augmentation algorithm follows in
Section 4 with pseudo-code and finally the experimental results are presented in
Section 5.
4 Implementation and Algorithm
The patch augmentation algorithm has been developed in Python using Keras.
Keras provides a Sequence class which allows you to create a generator that can
Patch Augmentation 5
Fig. 2: Examples of images created using patch augmentation. Patches are ex-
tracted from a random image in the training set, and can be from within the same
class, as shown in the bottom right image. Clockwise from the top left, the im-
age labels are [0.72220625, 0.27779375], [0.2832, 0.7168], [0.0, 1.0] and [0.918925,
0.081075] respectively.
be used to pass data to a network during training. Keras’ Sequence class handles
the segmentation of the data into batches, and also guarantees that each image in
the training set is passed exactly once to the network during each epoch.
As can be seen in Algorithm 1, every image within a batch that is about to
be passed to the network during training is augmented with a patch according to
a user-defined probability. If this probability is set to 0, no images are altered,
and the network trains with the dataset untouched. If this is set to 1 then every
image within every batch is augmented. If an image is augmented, this replaces
the image in the batch with the augmented sample and the same applies to its
corresponding new label. Once every image in the batch is cycled through, it is
passed to the network for training. By following the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1, it
can be seen that patches are being drawn from the entire training set. This means
patches could be drawn from images of the same class, or even, although highly
unlikely, the same image.
Algorithm 1: Patch augmentation algorithm.
Data: Batch of images x and labels y
Data: Training set x′ and labels y′
Data: Probability p = 0.5
1 foreach Image xi, label yi ∈ x, y do
2 if Rand(0, 1)< p then
3 xr, yr ← random image/label pair from x′, y′;
4 xp ← ExtractPatch(xr) ;
5 xi ← PlacePatch(xi, xp) ;
6 λ← Area(xp)
Area(xi)
;
7 yi ← (1− λ)yi + λyr ;
8 end
9 end
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Two aspects of the algorithm can be adjusted through parameters—the patch
size and the probability. The patches are of a random size, defined by a minimum
width/height dimension and a maximum width/height dimension. The extracted
patch is then placed at a random location within the bounds of the second image.
The probability parameter adjusts how many of the images are augmented—a
value of 0.5 means half of the images during an epoch are augmented with patches.
In our experiments, the parameters that resulted in the best overall performance
were a minimum dimension of 0.3 and maximum of 0.8, and a probability of 0.9.
The augmented images’ one-hot-encoded labels are generated using a linear
transformation of the image pair’s labels. Concretely, for a given augmented train-
ing image, the new image’s label is calculated as follows (we will use the notation
described in [16] for consistency):
y˜ = (1− λ)yi + λyj
The value for λ is calculated as follows:
λ =
Ap
Ax
where Ap denotes the area in pixels of the patch, and Ax denotes the area in
pixels of the image.
It follows, therefore, that:
y˜ =
(
1− Ap
Ax
)
yi +
Ap
Ax
yj
For example, a patch of size 200×200 placed within an image of size 400×400
would result in:
λ =
Ap
Ax
=
200 · 200
400 · 400 =
40000
160000
= 0.25
Hence:
y˜ = (1− 0.25)× [1.0, 0.0] + 0.25× [0.0, 1.0]
y˜ = [0.75, 0.25]
New labels are generated for each newly created, augmented image. It is a
requirement for patch augmentation that the labels are one hot encoded. The
approach can be generalised to any number of classes, as demonstrated later us-
ing the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 data sets, which contain 10 and 100 classes
respectively.
5 Experiments and Results
In our experiments to evaluate the method’s effect on model accuracy, we used
the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 data sets. CIFAR-10 comprises 60,000 32×32 pixel
images across 10 classes, equally distributed. 50,000 images are used for training
and 10,000 are used for testing. CIFAR-100 is identical except that is consists of
100 classes with 600 images each [9]. The ResNet networks were chosen as they are
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not very computationally demanding, and their saved model sizes are small and
can be shared online more easily. Our hardware setup was a single workstation
utilising a Titan X GPU running on Ubuntu 18.04. Due to these rather modest
hardware resources, we had to consider reasonably sized networks and data sets.
All experiments, using both versions of ResNet were trained for 200 epochs,
using a learning rate scheduler, adjusting from a starting learning rate of 0.001 and
reducing after epoch 100, 140, 180, and 190. The loss function used throughout
was categorical cross entropy in order to properly handle the one-hot-encoding
categorical label vectors utilised by patch augmentation.
Our experimental results are encouraging, with patch augmentation consis-
tently outperforming baseline accuracy on several data set and network configura-
tions. For CIFAR-10 using ResNet20v1 we achieved a baseline accuracy of 80.86%,
which improved to 89.33% with patch augmentation (an increase of 8.47%). For
CIFAR-10 using ResNet29v2 we achieved a baseline accuracy of 83.15% compared
to 91.19% accuracy when using patch augmentation (an increase of 8.04%). When
compared to mixup, patch augmentation slightly outperformed it, with mixup
achieving 86.62% accuracy on CIFAR-10 using ResNet20v1. Regarding CIFAR-
100, we achieved a baseline accuracy of 44.08%, which improved to 61.41% when
using patch augmentation, an increase of 17.33% using ResNet20v1. In turn,
ResNet29v2’s baseline on CIFAR-100 was measured at 52.21%, which increased
to 68.06% when trained with patch augmentation, an increase of 15.85% accuracy
on the test set.
A summary for all results using both ResNet20v1 and ResNet29v2 trained with
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 can be seen in Table 1.
Model/Dataset No Augmentation Fixed Patch Size Random Patch Size
CIFAR-10 ResNet20v1 80.86% 86.83% (+5.97%) 89.33% (+8.47%)
ResNet29v2 83.15% 88.01% (+4.86%) 91.19% (+8.04%)
CIFAR-100 ResNet20v1 44.08% 55.15% (+11.07%) 61.41% (+17.33%)
ResNet29v2 52.21% 59.77% (+7.56%) 68.06% (+15.85%)
Table 1: Results of the patch augmentation method, using both fixed patch sizes
and random patch sizes. Random patch sizes consistently outperform fixed patch
sizes. Best results in boldface.
Two main parameters can be controlled when evaluating patch augmentation’s
performance: namely the patch’s maximum and minimum width and height (con-
trolling the patch’s area) and the probability that an image is augmented when
being passed to the network for training. The parameters that were chosen are
described in the sub-sections below for each data set and network architecture.
5.1 CIFAR-10
Baseline accuracies were measured using an identical network configuration, an
identical train/test split, and an identical learning rate scheduler. When using the
ResNet20v1 network trained on CIFAR-10 a baseline performance at 80.86% was
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measured. When trained with patch augmentation, using a minimum dimension
of 0.3 and maximum of 0.9, and a probability of 0.9, we obtained an accuracy
of 89.33%. Switching the network architecture to ResNet29v2, a baseline accu-
racy of 83.15% was recorded. With patch augmentation, accuracy increased to
91.19%. Again this used a minimum dimension of 0.3 and maximum of 0.9, and a
probability of 0.9. Slightly different parameters were chosen for CIFAR-100.
5.2 CIFAR-100
For CIFAR-100, we again trained both ResNet20v1 and ResNet29v2 networks.
The baseline accuracy for ResNet20v1 was measured at 44.08%. This increased to
61.41% using patch augmentation, using a minimum dimension of 0.3 and maxi-
mum of 0.8, and a probability of 0.9. When training ResNet29v2 on CIFAR-100 a
baseline accuracy was measured at 52.21% which improved to 68.06% when trained
with patch augmentation. Baseline accuracy was measured using an identical con-
figuration of network, as described above.
Side-by-side comparisons of the baseline and patch augmentation accuracies
using ResNet20v1 trained with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 can be seen in Fig-
ure 3, while a comparison of their losses can be seen in Figure 4. A comparison
of the baseline and patch augmentation accuracies using ResNet29v2 trained with
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 can be seen in Figure 5, and likewise their losses can
be seen in Figure 6.
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Fig. 3: Accuracy comparison using ResNet20v1 trained with CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100, with and without patch augmentation, over 200 epochs.
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Fig. 4: Loss comparison using ResNet20v1 trained with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
with and without patch augmentation, over 200 epochs.
5.3 Fixed Patch Size
In order to control from the effect of the patch size on accuracy, and to investigate
whether randomly sized patches would outperform fixed sized patches, the same
experiments were performed using patches of a fixed size, the results of which are
presented below.
In each case the patch size was fixed at 25% or 50% of the area of the image
depending on the data set, and the probability was set at 0.5 for all experiments.
The ResNet20v1 network performance was measured at 80.86% as a baseline, and
86.83% using a network trained with patch augmentation, an improvement of
over 5%. ResNet29v2 network performance was 88.01% with patch augmentation
compared to 83.15% for the baseline.
The baseline for CIFAR-100 using ResNet20v1 was 44.08% accuracy. Using
patch augmentation with fixed patch sizes, the results improved to 55.15% , an
improvement of over 10%. The results for the patch augmentation run were ob-
tained using a probability of 0.5 and a patch area of 50%, as opposed to 25% for
the CIFAR-10 runs. When using ResNet29v2, we saw the baseline for CIFAR-100
of 52.21%. However, CIFAR-100 with patch augmentation improved to 59.77%,
an increase in accuracy of over 7% from the baseline. See Table 1 for these results
compared to those using randomly sized patches.
While the accuracies obtained using a fixed patch size outperformed the base-
line values in all experiments, the best results were consistently obtained using
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Fig. 5: Accuracy comparison using ResNet29v2 trained with CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100, with and without patch augmentation, over 200 epochs.
randomly sized patches. This is likely due to the increased variance of the datasets
produced by the randomised approach.
6 Robustness to Adversarial Attacks
In order to test the robustness of the networks trained with patch augmentation
to adversarial attacks, we used the CleverHans library [11].
CleverHans implements a number of adversarial attack creation algorithms.
These attacks accept a model and a test set as input, and they return the cor-
responding adversarial examples. A number of attacks are available, however we
tested the trained network using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6]. In
this white-box attack, where access to the trained model is required to generate
the attacks, the network’s gradients are used to create the adversarial example
that will trick the network. For a given input image, x, FGSM uses the gradients
of the loss w.r.t. the input image to create a new image, x˜, that maximises the
loss [15]:
x˜ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y))
where  controls the magnitude of the perturbation—in our case, this was set
to 0.001 and 0.03 to see the effect of the perturbation change. Larger values of 
means the network is more likely to misclassify x˜, however this also means that
it is more detectable by a human. We benchmarked the robustness of our method
to adversarial attack using v3.0.1 of CleverHans. On a test set modified by the
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Fig. 6: Loss comparison using ResNet29v2 trained with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
with and without patch augmentation, over 200 epochs.
Fast Gradient Sign Method with a max-norm  of 0.001, we obtained a test set
accuracy of (on the first 1,000 images in the CIFAR-10 test set) of 64.3% accuracy
using the non-augmented model, versus 72.5% accuracy using the model trained
with patch augmentation (See Table 2).
Adversarial Attack No Augmentation Patch Augmentation
FGSM ( = 0.001) 64.3% 72.5%
FGSM ( = 0.03) 13.8% 20.1%
Table 2: Summary of trained model accuracies for FGSM generated adversarial
examples (ResNet20v1/CIFAR-10). Model trained using fixed patch size of 25%
and a probability of 0.5.
When increasing  to 0.03, accuracy degraded significantly, however the net-
work trained with patch augmentation still outperformed the non-augmented ap-
proach with an accuracy of 20.1% compared to 13.8% for the standard model.
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7 Conclusions
Data augmentation is an integral part of deep learning, and is used almost by
default for any neural network based model learning on image data. It is used to
train more general models, avoid over-fitting, and avoid memorisation.
In this paper we have provided a data-independent approach that increases
classification accuracy in a number of scenarios, but has also been shown to
strengthen networks against adversarial attacks. In terms of accuracy, we have
seen that patch augmentation increased the accuracy of neural networks on some
common data sets when compared to baseline models without any augmentation
applied. Accuracy increased by over 8% for CIFAR-10 and over 17% for CIFAR-
100. We have also seen that networks trained using patch augmentation are more
robust to adversarial examples and attacks generated with the Fast Gradient Sign
Method. This is of particular importance in artificial intelligence research, due to
recent papers highlighting how fragile some normally very well performing net-
works seem to be.
Further work may be needed to ascertain the best parameter choices for the
algorithm. We plan to explore the effect of augmentation on the patch data itself,
such as slight rotations or the addition of transparency. Also, we will experiment
with the placement of patches wholly within the host image, or allowing patches
to overlap beyond the border of the host image (in effect being cropped out of
the newly augmented image). Future work will concentrate on finding optimal
approaches, and there is much scope here for further development.
Last, the technique will be fully integrated in to the Augmentor software library
as a standard feature of the package, so that patch augmentation can be applied
to existing machine learning training pipelines conveniently.
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